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CAN YOU DIG IT? A NOTE ON THE 
U.S. SUPREME COURT’S ATOMIC 
ENERGY ACT PREEMPTION DECISION 
IN VIRGINIA URANIUM, INC. v. WARREN 
JOHN SHELDEN
 
The sharing of sovereign authority between the Federal government and 
the several states has been a point of serious contention since the sun rose 
on the American federalist system. The most recent iteration of this time-
honored American dispute concerned a mining regulation and was between 
the Commonwealth of Virginia (“Commonwealth”) and Virginia Uranium, 
Inc. (“Virginia Uranium”). The Atomic Energy Act (“AEA”) is a series of 
laws enacted by Congress that imposes exclusive federal power on the 
processing, transporting, and usage of radioactive materials.
1
 
Commonwealth law prohibits the mining of uranium, and so arguably 
regulates a matter specifically considered and regulated by federal law. 
Virginia Uranium, a mining company of the eponymous mineral, 
challenged the state law on the basis that it was preempted by federal law, 
and thus unconstitutional. In a split-majority decision the U.S. Supreme 
Court ultimately concluded that the Commonwealth’s ban on mining 
uranium was not preempted by federal law.
2
 The Court’s decision reflects 
concerns surrounding separating powers between the states and the federal 
government, as well as the division of authority between the judiciary and 
the legislature.  
                                                                                                             
 1. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2011–2021, 2022-2286i, 2296-2297h-13 (West 1992).  
 2. Virginia Uranium, Inc v. Warren, 139 S.Ct. 1894 (2019). 
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As a preliminary matter, background on uranium mining and processing 
is necessary to understand the content of this note. Uranium is a naturally 
occurring heavy metal with radioactive properties.
3
 Uranium-235 is a 
variety of the mineral that is commonly used to produce energy.
4
 After raw 
uranium ore is extracted from its place of natural deposit it undergoes a 
process of milling in which it is ground down to a powder and mixed with 
water to separate the precious mineral from the dirt and rocks that surround 
it.
5
 At the end of the milling process the separated uranium is processed 
further to prepare it for enrichment, while the leftover radioactive materials, 
known as tailings are disposed of in special storage facilities.
6
 Disposed 
tailings are typically stored piles near the milling location.
7
 The price of 
uranium has fluctuated over the last ten years, reaching a peak of $79.00 
per pound in December of 2011, while dipping as low as $17.00 per pound 
in November of 2016.
8
 Notwithstanding the fluctuations in the commodities 
market, uranium is still a sought after mineral as the “worldwide 
consumption of uranium is about 190 million pounds while its global 
extraction is 140 million.”
9
 In 2015 the United States lead global 
consumption, using nearly 19,000 metric tons of uranium, while France 
consumed the second most amount at about 9,000 metric tons.
10
 The 
dominant producer of uranium is Kazakhstan, which produced 21,750 
                                                                                                             




 4. Id. 
 5. How Uranium ore is made into nuclear fuel, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N, https://www| 
.world-nuclear.org/nuclear-basics/how-is-uranium-ore-made-into-nuclear-fuel.aspx (last 
visited Nov. 9, 2019) 
 6. Id. 
 7. Uranium Tailings, TOXTOWN (Oct. 2019), https://toxtown.nlm.nih.gov/sources-of-
exposure/uranium-tailings#:~:targetText=Uranium%20tailings%20are%20the%20radio 
active,located%20close%20to%20uranium%20mills. 
 8. Uranium Commodity Prices, MKTS. INSIDER, https://markets.businessinsider.com/ 
commodities/uranium-price (last visited Dec. 7, 2019). 
 9. Joyce Chepkemoi, The Leading Uranium Consuming Countries in the World, 
WORLD ATLAS (Apr. 25, 2017), worldatlas.com/articles/the-leading-uranium-consuming-
countries-in-the-world.html. 
 10. Id. 
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metric tons in 2018, vastly outpacing the 587 metric tons provided by the 
United States that same year.
11
   
I. Analysis of the Relevant Law and Associated Facts 
A. Commonwealth of Virginia 
Coles Hill is a geographic region located largely within Pittsylvania 
County in southern Virginia. In the early 1980s exploratory holes were 
drilled in the area by Marline and Union Carbide, which discovered 
enormous deposits of uranium ore.
12
 The Commonwealth’s General 
Assembly then imposed a moratorium on uranium mining to remain 
effective until a sufficient regime for issuing mining permits is enacted.
13
 
The moratorium states in part that “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of 
law, permit applications for uranium mining shall not be accepted by any 
agency of the Commonwealth prior to July 1, 1984, and until a program for 
permitting uranium mining is established by statute.”
14
 The Coal and 
Energy Commission was requested to evaluate the effects of a uranium 
mine in Coles Hill prior to the imposition of the moratorium, and it made 
policy recommendations shortly after the moratorium was put in place that 
would have contained the effects of uranium mining in the region.
15
 With 
this moratorium and a collapse in the price of uranium, all plans to mine 
Coles Hill were shelved until 2007 when Virginia Uranium, Inc., drilled 




After thirty years the Commonwealth’s approach to uranium mining has 
remained unchanged, but not unchallenged. In 2013 Virginia State Senator 
John Watkins proposed a bill to impose a regulatory regime and a tax 
scheme on uranium mining.
17
 The proposed legislation was greeted by 
special interests seeking to capitalize on the tons of ore located in Coles 
                                                                                                             
 11. World Uranium Mining Production, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N (Aug. 2019), 
htttps://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/mining-of-
uranium/world-uranium-mining-production.aspx (last visited Dec. 7, 2019). 
 12. Coles Hill, Virginia (Uranium), VA. ENERGY RESS, http://www.virginiaenergy 
resources.com/s/ColesHill.asp (last visited Oct. 19, 2019). 
 13. VA. CODE ANN. § 45.1-283 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.) 
 14. Id.  
 15. Va. Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 848 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 2017). 
 16. VA. ENERGY RES., supra note 2. See Va. Code Ann. § 45.1-274. 
 17. Julian Walker and Scott Harper, State senator to file bill to lift uranium-mining ban, 
THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT (Dec. 4, 2012) https://www.pilotonline.com/government/virginia/ 
article_1b01f355-77ae-59f5-96ad-b308ba44b0fb.html. 
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Hill, but it was also decried by activists concerned with environmental 
protection and public exposure to radiation.
18
 Several weeks later, Senator 
Watkins aborted the plan and pulled the bill from the Senate committee’s 
agenda.
19
 In this tension between local opposition and industrial interest 
Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. Warren arose.  
B. United States Federal Government 
Even in the twenty-fist century, the concept of nuclear energy is 
inescapably tied to potential danger and devastation. On August 6th and 9th 
of 1945 the world witnessed the vicious potential of atomic energy. The 
rapid development and the quick deployment of atomic weapons on the 
Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki brought the carnage of the 
Pacific theater of World War II to a close, but consequentially opened the 
door to the uncertainties of the atomic age. In the blink of an eye a single 
bomb was capable of destroying a city. The danger of the technology was 
quite clear, but the civic benefits were unexplored. It was a brave new 
world, and we needed to find a way to live in it.
20
 A year later Congress did 
its best to address these uncertainties by enacting the Atomic Energy Act of 
1946.
21
 However, the efficacy of the new law was hampered by the fact that 
many legislators were flying blind when the Act was going through 
Congress.
22
 The intent of the 1946 Act was focused on “protecting technical 
data and adverting nonpeaceful use of fissionable materials.”
23
 Pursuant to 
this purpose, the 1946 AEA created the Atomic Energy Commission 
(“AEC”), which oversaw the manufacturing and employment of nuclear 
resources via a licensing regime.
24
 
                                                                                                             
 18. Id. 
 19. Whitney Delbridge, Sen. John Watkins Withdraws Uranium Bill, ABC 13 NEWS 
(Jan. 31, 2013), https://wset.com/archive/sen-john-watkins-withdraws-uranium-mining-bill. 
 20. For more background on the socio-political fallout from the invention of nuclear 
technology in World War II see Dan Carlin, The Destroyer of Worlds, HARDCORE HISTORY 
(Jan. 24, 2017), https://dancarlin.com/hardcore-history-59-the-destroyer-of-worlds/.  
 21. Pub. L. 79-585, 60 Stat. 768 (1946). 
 22. Byron S. Miller, A Law is Passed—The Atomic Energy Act of 1946, 15 U. CHICAGO 
L. REV. 4, 799 (Summer 1948) (the combination of a new frontier of technology, emotional 
responses to the use of atomic weapons in war, politically active scientists, and competing 
post-war interests presented a unique challenge to legislators). 
 23. Steven B. Barnett, Environmental Law – Atomic Energy Act, 23 NAT. RESOURCES J. 
917 (1983). 
 24. Id.  
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Public interest in exploring the private use of nuclear materials was 
acknowledged by Congress, which amended the AEA in 1954.
25
 Nuclear 
energy was not just a military asset; it could revolutionize the energy sector. 
Under this amendment nuclear technology could be patented, government 
files could be released to the public, and funds could be distributed by the 
AEC for research.
26
 This change in law “stemmed from Congress’ belief 
that the national interest would be served if the Government encouraged the 
private sector to develop atomic energy for peaceful purposes under a 
program of federal regulation and licensing.”
27
 In 1959 the AEA was 
amended again in order to address cooperation with state governments.
28
 
The changes to the AEA in 1959 split the authority to regulate between the 
states and the U.S. government.  
Three types of state regulatory authority can be extrapolated from 
existing federal law. First, a state could enter into an agreement with the 
federal government to assume regulatory authority over source materials for 
the purpose of public safety.
29
 Second, absent an agreement a state could 
regulate any part of nuclear energy so long as it is not meant to regulate the 
dangers of radiation.
30
 Section 2021(k) states “[n]othing in this section shall 
be construed to affect the authority of any State or local agency to regulate 
activities for purposes other than protection against radiation hazards.”
31
 
Third, a state could regulate activities that take place upstream from federal 
jurisdiction without an agreement, regardless of the regulation’s purpose.
32
 
Because the Commonwealth did not have an agreement with the Federal 
government to devolve regulatory power, this note will address the latter 
two types. 
The AEA explains that states have a legitimate interest in the regulation 
of nuclear materials, and it supplies a framework for making agreements to 
transfer certain regulatory authorities from the federal government to the 
states.
33
 When an agreement is made under this body of law, “the State shall 
have authority to regulate the materials covered by the agreement for the 
                                                                                                             
 25. Pub. L. No. 83-703, 68 Stat. 919 (1954). 
 26. Barnett, supra note 12, at 918. 
 27. English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 81(1990). 
 28. Pub. L. No. 86-373, 73 Stat. 688 (1959). 
 29. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2021(b) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-138) 
 30. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2021(k) (Westlaw though Pub. L. No. 116-138) 
 31. Id. (emphasis added). 
 32. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2092 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-138) 
 33. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2021(a) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-138). 
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protection of the public health and safety from radiation hazards.”
34
 The 
federal government still has authority to regulate enrichment plants, 
importing and exporting uranium, and disposal of byproducts and other 
nuclear materials.
35
 Importantly, Congress recognized that states retain 
regulatory authority over these same practices “for purposes other than 
protection against radiation hazards.”
36
 Preemption issues aside, this 
provision effectively establishes that every state is able to regulate nuclear 
materials so long as it is not done in order to contain radiological dangers.  
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission retains exclusive control over the 
regulation of nuclear materials and activities for the purposes related to 
radiation hazards, but this authority may be shared with states if an 
agreement is forged between the two governments. Nevertheless, “[e]ven 
absent such an agreement . . . the state retains the right to regulate non-
radiation hazards.”
37
 In a lawsuit between Illinois and Kerr-McGee 
Chemical, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held 
that the AEA preempted nuclear regulation for the purpose of protecting the 
public from radiation, but that it did not preempt state power to regulate the 
very same materials for any other purpose.
38
 The U.S. Supreme Court 
shared in this opinion when it held that California’s regulation of nuclear 
power plant construction was not preempted by the AEA, because the 
state’s purpose was focused on economic regulation, not public safety.
39
  
When state regulations address unextracted nuclear material, it can be 
inferred from legal text that states have carte blanche regulatory power over 
uranium until it has been mined. This circumstance is particularly relevant 
to the Virginia Uranium decision. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(“NRC”) has licensing power over the possession of uranium, but a person 
does not incur liability for possession of uranium until “after its removal 
from its place of deposit in nature.”
40
 This restated verbatim in the NRC’s 
regulatory codes.
41
 The NRC is authorized to acquire lands that contain 
uranium deposits and to use those lands for uranium mining.
42
 However, 
                                                                                                             
 34. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2021(b) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-138).  
 35. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2021(c)(1–4) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-138). 
 36. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2021(k) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-138) (emphasis added). 
 37. Illinois v. Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp., 677 F.2d 571, 581 (7th Cir. 1982). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 
190 (1983). 
 40. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2092 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No 116-138). 
 41. 10 C.F.R. § 40.3 (West, Westlaw through 85 FR 21305). 
 42. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2096–2097 (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. 116-138). 
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there is no federal law particularizing the use of land that is not owned by 
the United States.  
II. Analysis of the Case 
A. Lower Court Decisions 
This matter began in U.S. District Court by Petitioners on August 5, 
2015, seeking “declaratory and injunctive relief against Virginia’s 
Governor, Secretary of Commerce and Trade, Secretary of Natural 
resources, and various officials affiliated with the Department of 
Environmental Quality (“DEQ”) or the Department of Mines, Minerals and 
Energy.”
43
 Petitioners moved the court to declare that the AEA preempted 
Virginia’s uranium mining ban, and to enjoin the Commonwealth from 
enforcing it.
44
 Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint asserting that the 
moratorium was not preempted and that certain named defendants were 
immune under the Eleventh Amendment of the United States.
45
  
The trial court explained that the Governor, Cabinet Secretaries, and the 
DEQ officials were immune from the lawsuit.
46
 In holding that the 
moratorium was not unconstitutional on the basis of field preemption, the 
trial court explained that although the AEA established various regulatory 
regimes for Federal authority it “institutes no permitting regime respecting 
nonfederal uranium deposits’ conventional mining and does not otherwise 
regulate nonfederal uranium deposits or their conventional mining.”
47
 The 
trial court further found that the moratorium did not intrude on existing 
Federal regulations, because the moratorium had no regulatory effect on 
milling and storing tailings.
48
 Because the trial court granted Respondent’s 
motion to dismiss, it further denied Virginia Uranium’s motion for 
summary judgment on the basis of mootness.
49
 
In 2017 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the 
trial court’s decision to dismiss.
50
 The appellate court provided more 
background information on the matter, explaining that the suit was filed 
after the interested parties had failed to persuade the legislature to lift the 
                                                                                                             
 43. Va. Uranium, Inc. v. McAuliffe, 147 F. Supp. 3d 462, 466 (W.D. Va. 2015).  
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 468. 
 47. Id. at 471.  
 48. Id. at 477.  
 49. Id. at 478. 
 50. Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 848 F.3d 590 at 593 (4th Cir. 2017). 
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 Virginia Uranium raised three arguments on appeal: first, 
that § 2021(k) considers uranium mining to be an “activity” that cannot be 
regulated by a state absent an agreement; second, that if mining is not an 
“activity” then the moratorium was intended to regulate milling and tailing 
storage for safety purposes; and third, that the moratorium was “an obstacle 
to the full implementation of the [AEA]’s objectives.”
52
  
The appellate court rejected Virginia Uranium’s arguments. In particular, 
the court’s dismissal of the second argument is material. In that argument 
Virginia Uranium requested a purpose inquiry, asking the appellate court 
look past the plain text of the moratorium, and to rule based on the 
motivations of the General Assembly.
53
 The appellate court refused to 
indulge in that analysis, and held that the moratorium regulated activity that 
was not within the scope of the AEA.
54
 Following the appellate court’s 
decision, Virginia Uranium petitioned for writ certiorari, which was granted 
on May 21, 2018.
55
  
B. Parties’ Positions and Legal Arguments 
1. Petitioners, Virginia Uranium, Inc., et al. 
The first argument Virginia Uranium advanced framed that the 
prohibition was imposed for the purpose of responding to concerns of 
radioactive risks associated with uranium processing. In the absence of an 
agreement with the NRC, regulatory authority over radioactive hazards is 
something that the federal government already has authority over.
56
 
Virginia Uranium asserted that the lower courts erred in ignoring the 
motivation for imposing the moratorium, and advocated for the Court to 
consider legislative intent.
57
 Virginia Uranium’s second argument was that 
the moratorium was unconstitutional on the basis of conflict preemption, in 
that it was “an obstacle to the accomplishments of the AEA’s purposes and 
objectives.”
58
 Petitioners asserted that by prohibiting uranium mining for 
                                                                                                             
 51. Id. at 594. 
 52. Id. at 594–95.  
 53. Id. at 597. 
 54. Id. at 599. 
 55. Va. Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 138 S.Ct. 2023 (Mem), 201 L.Ed.2d 277 (2018).  
 56. Brief for Petitioners at 26–28, Va. Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 139 S. Ct. 1894 (2019) 
(No. 16-1275), 2018 WL 3546327, at *26–*28.  
 57. Id. 
 58. Id.  
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the alleged purpose of public safety in the absence of an agreement, the 
Commonwealth frustrated federal objectives.
59
 
In its first proposition, Virginia Uranium submitted that the text of the 
“AEA establish limits on state authority that are drawn based on the 
purposes the States may pursue through regulation, not just the activities 
they may continue to regulate.”
60
 It posited that the structure of the 1959 
amendment to the AEA grants states the power to regulate for purposes of 
safety when there is an agreement and that § 2021(k) defines the limits of 
state authority in the absence of an agreement.
61
 It followed this explanation 
by arguing that if states were permitted to regulate for safety purposes 
absent an agreement, then § 2021 would be redundant.
62
 Virginia Uranium 
supported its “purpose & activity” framework with the PG&E decision.
63
 
Petitioners articulated that in the 1983 decision upholding California’s 
moratorium on nuclear power plants, the Court stressed the purpose for the 
ban, which was addressing an economic concern.
64
 In its brief, Petitioners 
emphasized the Court’s rejection of California’s safety purpose, which 
explained “the federal government has occupied an entire field of nuclear 
safety concerns, except the limited powers ceded to the states . . . A state 
moratorium on nuclear construction grounded in safety concerns falls 
squarely within the prohibited field.”
65
 
Virginia Uranium applied this legal position by first raising the fact that 
“[r]espondent have conceded for purposes of their motion to dismiss [that 
the ban] was motivated by the purpose of protecting against the radiological 
hazards of uranium milling and the storage of uranium tailings.”
66
 
Petitioners attempted to make it emphatically clear that the 
Commonwealth’s moratorium was imposed for a purpose that is expressly 
forbidden by § 2021(k), and recounted the holdings of the lower courts 
which refused to consider Virginia’s intent.
67
 In this argument Virginia 
Uranium asserted that Congress wanted the courts to assess a state’s 
                                                                                                             
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 31 (emphasis omitted). 
 61. Id. at 32. 
 62. Id. at 34. 
 63. Id. at 35. 
 64. Id. at 36. 
 65. Id. at 37 (quoting Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. 
Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190 at 212–13 (1983)). 
 66. Id. at 40. 
 67. Id. at 41–42. 
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In its second proposition, Virginia Uranium argued that the decisions of 
the lower courts frustrate the AEA’s objectives because it “would enable 
state and local governments to second-guess the NRC’s judgments across 
the entire universe of these issues, effectively declaring open season on the 
Nation’s atomic energy industry.”
69
 Virginia Uranium then advised the 
Court of lower court decisions that had struck down state and local laws 
that stifled the AEA’s objectives, such as a Utah city’s municipal ordinance 
that excluded a nuclear fuel storage facility from city services and required 
a nuclear fuel company to get permission from the state governor before it 
could use a highway.
70
 Even though Utah was well within its police powers 
to tailor provisions of fire services and sewer access, Petitioners argued, the 
efforts were condemned by the Tenth Circuit because the “regulation of 
those activities was motivated by radiological safety concerns related to 
materials within the NRC’s regulatory jurisdiction.”
71
 Virginia Uranium 
submitted that the Fourth Circuit’s holding “provide[d] what amounts to a 
road map showing state and local governments how to thwart the AEA’s 
purpose of promoting nuclear energy.”
72
 This “road map” Petitioners assert 
is simply that a state could get away with frustrating federal objectives in 
nuclear energy by regulating the source extraction of nuclear fuels.
73
  
Petitioners further argued that the Commonwealth’s moratorium is also 
unconstitutional because it “directly conflicts with federal law.”
74
 Virginia 
Uranium explained that “[s]tate law is in conflict with federal law if . . . it 
‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full 
purpose and objectives of Congress.’”
75
 Virginia Uranium’s logic naturally 
leads to the conclusion that, by preventing the mining of uranium, Virginia 
had simply stopped the Federal government’s interest in promoting the safe 
use of nuclear fuels. Petitioners characterize the mining moratorium as an 
                                                                                                             
 68. Id.  
 69. Id. at 47. 
 70. Id. at 47–48 (discussing Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians v. Nielson, 376 F.3d 
1223 (10th Cir. 2004)). 
 71. Id. at 48-49. 
 72. Id. at 53. 
 73. Id.  
 74. Id. at 55. 
 75. Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
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2. Respondents, John Warren, Director of the Virginia Department of 
Mines, Minerals and Energy, et al. 
The Commonwealth approached the issue of this case as whether the 
AEA regulates uranium mining, and tailored its first argument to assert that 
it does not.
77
 Respondent argued that § 2021(k) does not preempt the 
moratorium, and that the Federal provision actually “cautions courts against 
drawing any preemptive inference from provisions of the 1959 Act that 
gave States a new mechanism for obtaining regulatory authority over 
certain matters that previously had been the exclusive province of the 
Federal Government.”
78
 Respondent cautioned the Court against indulging 
in an analysis of legislative intent for preemption issues as it “is an 
enterprise destined to produce confusion worse confounded.”
79
 In its second 
argument, the Commonwealth asserted that the moratorium is not 
invalidated by conflict preemption because the law is focused only on 
mining and “Congress has never sought to reduce or limit a State’s inherent 
power to regulate uranium mining within its borders.”
80
 The 
Commonwealth argued that the AEA has always striven to protect state 
power over uranium mining, and the scope of state participation in 
furthering nuclear interests has been expanded by the Act.
81
 
In the Commonwealth’s first argument it is asserted that there is no 
preemption issue present in the case. Respondent commenced this argument 
with an examination of the Supremacy doctrine, asserting that a 
“preemption analysis ‘start[s] with the assumption that the historic police 
powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless 
that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”
82
 Thus, there is no 
express preemption. The Commonwealth further articulated that this is not 
a field preemption case because the AEA is silent on an intent to prevent 
                                                                                                             
 76. Id. at 58. 
 77. Brief for Respondent at 16–17, Va. Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 139 S.Ct. 1894 (2019) 
(No. 16-1275), 2018 WL 4105540 (emphasis omitted). 
 78. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 79. Id. (quoting Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 
393, 404 (2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 19 (quoting Wyeth v. Leving, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009)) (alteration in 
original). 
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states from regulating activities that are not under the NRC’s power.
83
 Then 
it asserted that there is no conflict preemption because the AEA did not 
mean to curtail the power to regulate uranium mining held by the states.
84
 
The Commonwealth heavily stressed that in order to overcome the 
presumption against preemption requires more than the fact that § 2021 
general applies to state authority.
85
 Respondent then countered Petitioner’s 
argument that § 2021(k) preempts the moratorium by arguing that the 
provision actually “preserves state authority by directing courts not to draw 
preemptive inferences from the rest of Section 2021.”
86
 Where Petitioners 
called to this provision as a sword, Respondent deployed it as a shield.  
Respondent proceeded to challenge the Petitioner’s argument that the 
Court should consider the purpose of the moratorium and not just its 
activity.
87
 Virginia Uranium wanted the Court to approach this analysis as a 
matter of historical fact, however, the Commonwealth argued that 
Petitioners failed to adequately support this assertion.
88
 Respondent 
acknowledged that the judiciary will treat legislative purpose as historical 
fact, but it has only done so in “claims of racial discrimination under the 
Equal Protection Clause.”
89
 Virginia then drew the Court’s attention to 
AEA cases in which the Court has analyzed legislative intent, but did not 
investigate the motivations of lawmakers.
90
 In this argument, Respondent 




Respondent countered Virginia Uranium’s assertion that the moratorium 
presents a conflict preemption issue by relying on the rule that “conflict 
preemption exists where compliance with both state and federal law is 
impossible, or where the state law stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress.”
92
 The Commonwealth asserted that obedience to the moratorium 
                                                                                                             
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 19–20. 
 85. Id. at 21. 
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does not require Virginia Uranium to violate Federal law.
93
 It was further 
argued that if the Court held that the moratorium presents an obstacle to the 
AEA, then it would render the AEA unconstitutional under the doctrine of 
anti-commandeering, because it would in effect be Congress requiring 
states to implement regulatory regimes on uranium mining due to the fact 
that Congress lacks its own authority to regulate mining.
94
 The 
Commonwealth closed its argument by stating that it is congressional 
prerogative to modify the regulatory authority shared by the 
Commonwealth and the NRC “when it comes to uranium mining . . . [b]ut, 
absent such [legislative] action, the correct instruction to draw from the 
text, structure, and history of the [AEA] is that Congress did not intend to 
preempt state regulation of conventional uranium mining.”
95
 
C. Analysis of the Court’s Decision 
The decision to affirm the judgment of the lower court was made up by 
an overall majority of six Associate Justices, split in half by reasoning. The 
leading opinion was written by Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justices Thomas 
and Kavanaugh; while Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Sotomayor and 
Kagan filed a concurring opinion. Chief Justice Roberts filed a dissenting 
opinion, in which he was joined by Justices Breyer and Alito.  
1. The Leading Opinion  
At the introduction of the opinion, Justice Gorsuch wrote that it is the 
Court’s responsibility “to respect not only what Congress wrote but, as 
importantly, what it didn’t write.”
96
 Virginia Uranium asserted that the 
moratorium was preempted because under the AEA the NRC has exclusive 
regulatory power in the field of nuclear energy, and that due to the lack of 
NRC guidance on mining, it was able to dig up uranium anywhere in the 
United States, including in Coles Hill.
97
 Preemption doctrine is derived 
from the Supremacy Clause, which is that the “Constitution, and the laws of 
the United States . . . shall be the supreme law of the Land; and the Judges 
in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or 
Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding.”
98
 A state law may be 
preempted by federal law in three different ways: express, field, or 
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 Virginia Uranium claimed that the Commonwealth’s mining ban 
was preempted by the AEA on the bases of field and conflict.
100
  
The leading opinion addressed field preemption first and rejected 
Virginia Uranium’s position. Justice Gorsuch noted that field preemption 
takes place when “Congress evidences an intent to occupy a given field, 
[then] any state law falling within that field is preempted.”
101
 He explained 
that although it is clear that federal law regulates processing and 
distribution of uranium, the law states “that the NRC’s regulatory powers 
arise only ‘after [uranium’s] removal from its places of natural deposit.’”
102
 
Then Justice Gorsuch addressed the fact that the NRC already has a narrow 
authority to regulate mining itself, however noting that power exists only 
over federal lands, and that the only thing the NRC may do with private 
land is purchase it from the owner.
103
 Therefore, “Congress . . . has spoken 
directly to the question of uranium mining on private land, and every bit of 
what it’s said indicates that state authority remains untouched.”
104
 
Virginia Uranium also argued that 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k) preempts 
Virginia’s law because the statute displaces state laws that regulate any 
component of nuclear energy “if that law was enacted for the purpose of 
protecting the public against ‘radiation hazards.’”
105
 Integral to this 
argument was the company’s assertion that the mining ban was 
implemented for the impermissible purpose of public safety. The lead 
opinion rejected this argument. Section 2021(k) is part of a series of statutes 
establishing a procedure for the NRC to devolve some of its regulatory 
authority to state governments pursuant to a agreement; however, this 
provision is clearly intended to establish that absent an agreement states 
may regulate nuclear energy so long as it is not furthering an interest in 
public safety.
106
 In fact, Virginia Uranium’s proposed reading of § 2021(k) 
is the exact opposite of what a plain reading would yield.
107
  
The leading opinion then addressed Virginia Uranium’s request to 
explore the Commonwealth’s intent in implementing the ban. The three 
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Justices rejected this invitation, explaining that doing so was not only 
uncalled for because regulation of mining was not within the NRC’s 
authority, but also because doing so would be inconsistent with how the 
Court has resolved claims of field preemption in the past.
108
 Justice 
Gorsuch wrote that “[t]he natural tendency of regular federal judicial 
inquiries into state legislative intentions would be to stifle deliberation in 
state legislatures and encourage resort to secrecy and subterfuge.”
109
 
Because legislative intent is such an ambiguous concept, obtaining the 
relevant information would require “depositions of state legislators and 
governors, and perhaps [having to] hale them into court for cross-
examination at trial about their subjective motivations in passing a mining 
statute.”
110
 Virginia Uranium argued that an inquiry into the legislative 
intent would be simple as Respondent had conceded to the factual 
allegations; however, the Commonwealth contended that it merely accepted 
the claims as true for the purpose of the motion to dismiss filed pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
111
 The Commonwealth explained 
that if the case were to progress further “a more searching judicial inquiry 
into the law’s motivation would be inevitable.”
112
 Thus, as a matter of 
separation of powers, the lead opinion refused to accept Virginia Uranium’s 
argument, explaining that to do so “would require serious intrusions into 
state legislative processes in future cases.”
113
 
Next, the lead opinion tackled Virginia Uranium’s conflict preemption 
claim. This type of preemption occurs “when it is impossible to comply 
with both state and federal law . . . or where the state law stands as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress.”
114
 Virginia Uranium asserted that the mining ban “st[ood] as an 
impermissible ‘obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full 
purposes and objectives of Congress.’”
115
 The company asserted Congress’s 
objectives in the AEA of fostering nuclear power at low safety and 
environmental risks have been frustrated by the mining ban because it 
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subverts the NRC’s regulatory authority of activities occurring after the 
minerals has been extracted.
116
 
The lead opinion dismissed this argument. Justice Gorsuch explained 
that “any ‘evidence of preemptive purpose,’ whether express or implied, 
must therefore be ‘sought in the text and structure of the statute at 
issue.’”
117
 Contrary to Virginia Uranium’s position, the AEA does not 
include such an expressed purpose. Justice Gorsuch explained why he 
disagreed with Virginia Uranium’s approach to analyzing legislative 
purpose: 
Trying to discern what motivates legislators individually and 
collectively invites speculation and risks overlooking the reality 
that individual Members of Congress often pursue multiple and 
competing purposes, many of which are compromised to secure 
a law’s passage and few of which are fully realized in the final 
product . . . In disregarding these legislative compromises, we 
may only wind up displacing perfectly legitimate state laws on 
the strength of “purposes” that only we can see, that may seem 
perfectly logical to us, but that lack the democratic provenance 




Justice Gorsuch emphasized that when purpose is not explicitly stated the 
dynamics and complexities of legislating law forecloses the possibility of 
synthesizing an accurate purpose based solely upon inference. Due to the 
complications and dynamics of legislating national law in a democratic 
format the interpretation is confined to the four-corners of the statute, 
because “[t]he only thing a court can be sure of is what can be found in the 
law itself.”
119
 The leading opinion explained that the moratorium was not 
preempted under this doctrine because “every indication in the law before 
us suggests that Congress elected to leave mining regulation on private land 
to the States and grant the NRC regulatory authority only after uranium is 
removed from the earth.”
120
  
Although Virginia Uranium did not raise the argument before the Court, 
Justice Gorsuch addressed the “purposes-and-objectives branch of conflict 
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 This route of pursuing conflict preemption rests on the 
practice that the Court “can sometimes infer a congressional intent to 
displace a state law that makes compliance with a federal statute 
impossible.”
122
 Virginia Uranium did not submit this argument because 
“[n]ot only can Virginia Uranium comply with both state and federal laws; 
it is also unclear whether laws like Virginia’s might have a meaningful 
impact on the development of nuclear power in this country.”
123
 Justice 
Gorsuch then explained that the moratorium did not appear to impair 
federal objectives because the majority of uranium consumed in the United 
States is imported and most uranium mines are under federal authority, far 
from state powers.
124
 Furthermore, if the moratorium was contrary to 
federal objectives, the NRC could obtain Coles Hill by purchase or seizure 
by using authority granted to it by § 2096.
125
 Lastly, he wrote, Congress 
could amend the AEA to compensate for whatever problems are created by 
the moratorium, a course of action “which this Court should never be 
tempted into pursuing on its own.” 
2. The Concurring Opinion 
Justices Kagan and Sotomayor joined Justice Ginsburg in agreeing with 
the leading opinion’s conclusion that the AEA did not preempt the 
Commonwealth’s moratorium.
126
 However Justice Ginsburg wrote 
separately because the leading opinion’s “discussion of the perils of 
inquiring into legislative motive . . . sweeps well beyond the confines of 
this case, and therefore seems to me inappropriate in an opinion speaking 
for the Court, rather than for individual members of the Court.”
127
 She 
explained that through the AEA the federal government monitors many 
aspects of uranium use and disposal, but that it “does not regulate 
conventional uranium mining on private land, having long taken the 
position that its authority begins ‘at the mill, rather than at the mine.’”
128
  
The concurrence proceeded to discuss the relevant laws of Virginia and 
the United States. Justice Ginsburg explained that after discovering the 
deposit in Coles Hill “the General Assembly authorized uranium 
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exploration but imposed a one-year moratorium on uranium mining.”
129
 
The reasoning behind this policy decision “was ‘to encourage and promote 
the safe and efficient exploration for uranium resources within the 
Commonwealth, and to assure . . . that uranium mining and milling will be 
subject to statutes and regulations which protect the environment and the 
health and safety of the public.’”
130
 The concurrence then notes that a year 
later the Virginia General Assembly prolonged the moratorium, and “has 
not established a permitting program, so the ban remains in force.”
131
  
Justice Ginsburg addressed Virginia Uranium’s field preemption 
argument first.
132
 She explained that “[§] 2021(k) presupposes federal 
preemption of at least some state laws enacted to guard ‘against radiation 
hazards.’”
133
 The concurrence then states that the Commonwealth’s 
contention that federal preemption applies only to the activities controlled 
by the NRC is a “better reading of the statute,” than what is taken by 
Virginia Uranium and the dissent, who argue that every activity intended to 
regulate the hazards of radiation is preempted by federal law.
134
 Justice 
Ginsburg’s reasoning was that since the AEA is silent on conventional 
mining on private land, and the Commonwealth’s moratorium only applies 
to conventional mining, “it is hard to see how or why a state law on the 
subject would be preempted, whatever the reason for the law’s 
enactment.”
135
 This reasoning is not contradicted by the language of § 
2021(k), because in the broader context of § 2021 the term “activities” is 
most logically interpreted to “mean[] activities regulated by the NRC.”
136
 
As such, any activity not regulated by the NRC may be regulated by the 
states in the absence of an agreement, regardless of the state’s purpose. 
The concurrence corroborated this point with legislative history behind § 
2021(k). Justice Ginsburg wrote that the adoption of “§ 2021(k) is most 
sensibly read to clarify that the door newly opened for state regulation left 
in place preexisting state authority.”
137
 This is because “House and Senate 
reports are explicit on this point: Section 2021(k) was ‘intended to make 
clear that the bill does not impair the State[s’] authority to regulate 
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activities of [federal] licensees for the manifold of health, safety, and 
economic purposes other than radiation protection.’”
138
  
Justice Ginsburg then rejected the Solicitor General’s argument that the 
moratorium “is preempted because it is a pretext for regulating the 
radiological safety hazards of milling and tailings storage.”
139
 In its 
argument, the Solicitor General analogized the instant case to National 
Meat Association v. Harris, which struck down a series of California laws 
regulating the slaughtering of non-ambulatory pigs since “the sale ban fell 
within the scope of the [Federal Meat Inspector] Act’s express preemption 
clause because it was intended to work together with other California 
provisions to impose additional requirements on slaughterhouse 
operations.”
140
 This argument submitted by the Solicitor General is 
essentially that the mining moratorium is preempted because it effectively 
regulates activities that are regulated by the NRC. However, Justice 
Ginsburg noted that there was no expressed preemption present in the 
dispute, and that the Commonwealth’s moratorium is silent on milling and 
tailings storage.
141
 In dismissing this creative argument, she concluded that 
“[a] state law regulating an upstream activity within the State’s authority is 




The concurrence then turned the conflict preemption claims raised by 
Virginia Uranium and the U.S. Solicitor General, addressing each of the 
four arguments individually. First, the argument that the moratorium upset a 
balance in federal interests of energy innovation and public safety was 
rejected because the United States “does not regulate the radiological safety 
of conventional uranium mining on private land, so federal law struck no 
balance in this area.”
143
 Second, the contention that the Commonwealth was 
obstructing federal interest in promoting nuclear power was dismissed 
because “[g]iven the absence of federal regulation in point, it is improbable 
that the Federal Government has a purpose or objective of promoting 
conventional uranium mining on private land.”
144
 Third, Virginia 
                                                                                                             
 138. Id. (quoting S. Rep. No. 870, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. At 12) (bracketing original).  
 139. Id. at 1914. For more information on the Solicitor General’s arguments see Brief for 
the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. 
Warren, 139 S.Ct. 1894 (2019) (No. 16-1275), 2018 WL 3599466.  
 140. Id. at 1914 (quoting Nat’l Meat Ass’n v. Harris, 565 U.S. 452, 463–64 (2012)). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 1915. 
 143. Id.  
 144. Id. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020
788 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 5 
  
 
Uranium’s argument that the moratorium is preempted as it is regulation 
that circumvents § 2021 by indirectly regulating milling and tailing storage 
was rejected on the basis that the moratorium “has not regulated the 
radiological safety of tailings storage; it has prohibited only the an 
antecedent activity subject to exclusive state authority.”
145
 Fourth and final, 
the concurrence rejected the argument posed by the United States that the 
moratorium frustrated the federal government’s interests because “federal 
regulation of certain activities does not mean that States must authorize 
activities antecedent to those federally regulated.”
146
  
3. The Dissenting Opinion 
Justices Breyer and Alito joined Chief Justice Roberts in a unified 
dissenting opinion. Chief Justice Roberts commenced the opinion by raising 
his objection to the leading opinion, asserting that the Justices had “sets out 
to defeat an argument that no one made, reaching a conclusion with which 
no one disagrees.”
147
 The dissent stressed that the leading opinion missed 
the mark by focusing on uranium mining under the AEA, while the true 
issue of the case was “whether a State can purport to regulate a field that is 
not preempted (uranium mining safety) as an indirect means of regulating 
other fields that are preempted (safety concerns about uranium milling and 
tailings storage).”
148
 The Chief Justice submitted that the answer is easy, 
because “our precedent is clear: The AEA prohibits state laws that have the 
purpose and effect of regulating preempted fields.”
149
 
The Chief Justice commenced his preemption analysis by raising the 
legal principle that “a state law is preempted not only when it ‘conflicts 
with federal law,’ but also when its purpose is to regulate within a 
preempted field.”
150
 He explained that in PG&E California’s ban on the 
construction of all new nuclear power plants was permissible for the 
purpose of economic regulation; however, if the state had been regulating 
the construction of plants itself (e.g., design specifications) or had banned 
all construction for a purpose related to radiation safety, the laws would 
have been preempted by the AEA.
151
 Facially the law was valid because the 
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manner was not preempted, but the true issue in that case was the purpose; 
when the Court accepted the “non-safety rationale” submitted by California, 
the laws were upheld as constitutional.
152
 The Chief Justice argued that 
PG&E’s authority should have directed Justice Gorsuch’s decision: 
although the Commonwealth’s moratorium was facially valid, its failure to 
demonstrate a purpose independent from radiation safety rendered the law 
preempted by the AEA.
153
 He continued with explaining that the purpose of 
PG&E’s intent prong was to prevent state circumvention of the AEA by an 




The dissent argued that the leading and the concurring opinions departed 
from this precedent by not seriously considering of the Commonwealth’s 
purpose. Chief Justice Roberts attacked the split majority, asserting that its 
rule has established that “so long as the State is not boneheaded enough to 
express its real purpose in the statute, the State will have free rein to subvert 
Congress’s judgment on nuclear safety.”
155
 Under this rule, he complained, 
“[a] State could . . . restrict the ability of a county to provide a nuclear 
facility with municipal services . . . [or] eliminate limited liability for the 
stockholders of companies that operate nuclear facilities.”
156
 The Chief 
Justice applauded the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Skull Valley, which 
“concluded that the ‘state cannot use its authority to regulate law 




The Chief Justice then turned his attention to the applicability of the 
National Meat decision.
158
 In that case there was a federal law that 
regulated the intake process for slaughterhouses, while California law 
prohibited commercial sales of meat not slaughtered in accordance with 
state regulations.
159
 That decision was relevant to this matter, because 
“[a]lthough the federal statute’s preemption clause did ‘not usually 
foreclose state regulation of the commercial sales activities of 
slaughterhouses,’ we unanimously held that California’s sales regulation 
                                                                                                             
 152. Id. 
 153. Id.  
 154. Id. at 1919. 
 155. Id.  
 156. Id. (referring to Skull Valley Band of Goshute v. Nielson, 376 F.3d 1223, 1247–48, 
1250–52).  
 157. Id. (quoting Skull Valley, 376 F.3d at 1248). 
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was preempted because it was a transparent attempt to circumvent federal 
law.”
160
 Chief Justice Roberts was unpersuaded by the concurrence’s 
approach to this precedent, which distinguished it based on where the state 
regulations took place in the stream, stating that the difference was 
immaterial because “[r]egardless whether the state regulation is 
downstream like National Meat, upstream like here and Pacific Gas, or 
entirely out of the stream like Skull Valley, States may not legislate with the 
purpose and effect of regulating a federally preempted field.”
161
 
That is the dissent’s conclusion, that although the manner and method of 
state regulation is material to a preemption issue, the state’s purpose in the 
regulation is equally important to consider. The Chief Justice called out the 
leading opinion’s avoidance of this inquiry, explaining that there isn’t a 
choice because “statute and precedent plainly require such an approach 
here . . . and the difficulty of the task does not permit us to choose an easier 
way.”
162
 Assessing legislative purpose is always difficult, but the Chief 
Justice concluded that it is a necessary component to a field preemption 
analysis. The Commonwealth’s purpose of imposing the uranium mining 
moratorium is what caused it to be preempted by federal law, and the 
majority’s refusal to undergo a purpose inquiry rendered its decision 
something that the Chief Justice could not join. 
III. Argument in Support of the Concurring Opinion 
This decision presents a complicated landscape for future precedent. 
There are three differing opinions, each supported by three judges. The 
concurring opinion submitted by Justice Ginsburg and joined by Justices 
Sotomayor and Kagan is the most logically sound, and it is the shortest 
departure from existing precedent; therefore, its authority ought to provide 
the guiding light for lower courts in future AEA preemption cases. The only 
thing that fundamentally distinguishes the leading and concurring opinions 
is Justice Gorsuch’s position on the purpose inquiry, otherwise the two 
opinions are exceedingly similar in their reasoning and naturally identical in 
their judgments. 
Justice Gorsuch explained that the Court ought not take part in a purpose 
analysis for what appears to be his personal adherence to judicial restraint 
and separation of powers. He explained that a consequence of a judicial 
inquiry into legislative intent “would be to stifle deliberation in the state 
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legislatures and encourage resort to secrecy and subterfuge.”
163
 I agree with 
Justice Ginsburg that there is no need to engage in a purpose inquiry, 
because the federal law is absent in conventional mining on private lands.
164
 
She addressed the applicability of PG&E head on in the case, concluding 
that the reason why the Court engaged in an inquiry analysis in that 
decision was because California’s law affecting the construction of nuclear 
power plants was closely related to the federal government’s regulation of 
nuclear power.
165
 However, in this case, it was undisputed that the AEA 
lacked authority over conventional uranium mining on private land, and 
that the moratorium “target[ed] an exclusively state-regulated activity.”
166
 
I further agree with the concurrence’s approach to the U.S. Solicitor 
General’s pretext argument. The Commonwealth’s moratorium on uranium 
mining interferes with millings and tailings storage by the natural fact that it 
is impossible to mill uranium without first extracting it. Unlike California’s 
regulation of slaughtering non-ambulatory animals, the Commonwealth’s 
mining ban has no engagement with federal regulations. In National Meat, 
the Court described the relevant federal law to contain a “preemption clause 
[that] sweeps widely”
167
 and that “California’s statute substitutes a new 
regulatory scheme for the [federal] one.”
168
 Unlike that case, there is no 
federal law that regulates conventional mining on private lands, so there is 
nothing for the moratorium to be preempted by.  
Justice Ginsburg draws attention to the fact that there isn’t a provision 
that expressly preempts the Commonwealth’s authority to ban uranium 
mining. The arguments submitted by Virginia Uranium and the Solicitor 
General are flawed because they unreasonably rely on § 2021(k), which is 
textually unrelated to uranium mining; and the PG&E decision, which 
pertained to a law regulating an activity controlled by the NRC. If the 
Commonwealth was attempting to regulate activities like millings or 
transportation of uranium, then the Court would need to conduct a purpose 
inquiry because the Commonwealth would be regulating an “activity” 
within the bailiwick of the AEA and NRC. But since the moratorium did 
not touch federal authority, a purpose inquiry was unnecessary.  
Regarding the purpose inquiry and pretext regulation issues, I also side 
with the concurrence over the dissent. For the most part I agree with the 
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dissent’s reasoning, but it is misplaced. It undertook a purpose and pretext 
inquiry just for the sake of doing one. The dissent treated this matter as if it 
was identical to National Meat and PG&E, in which the Commonwealth 
was regulating something already covered by federal law. However, the 
dissent missed the mark, because the AEA doesn’t apply to the activity 
affected by the mining ban. In a footnote, the dissent argued that there isn’t 
a distinction in National Meat and this case, because California’s 
commercial regulation of meat sales is just as much within its police powers 
as Virginia’s authority of mining.
169
 I am unpersuaded by this comparison. 
What Chief Justice Roberts omits in this argument is the fact that the 
California law at issue in National Meat was an omnibus prohibition 
applying to the shipment, holding, slaughtering, processing, and sale of 
non-ambulatory animals and the meat from those animals.
170
 California’s 
regulatory regime effectively sandwiched the federal government’s 
regulation of slaughterhouses, which already provided specific provisions 
for approving meat from non-ambulatory animals as a matter of interstate 
commerce. California had control over the non-ambulatory animals from 
farm to table, which is significantly different from the Commonwealth’s 
mining ban.  
The Commonwealth’s moratorium on uranium mining is simply a ban on 
uranium mining. A license is required to mine minerals in Virginia,
171
 and 
the law prohibits the issuance of a license for uranium mining until an 
adequate licensing regime can be implemented.
172
 Processing and 
transporting uranium within the Commonwealth is unaffected by this code; 
under it, any person could buy, sell, or possess uranium in Virginia without 
running afoul of the law. Naturally, not being able to extract uranium from 
its place of natural deposit makes it difficult to engage those types of 
activities, but the code is silent on such matters. The dissent’s argument on 
the purpose inquiry is really only viable if federal law could preempt the 
challenged state law. Preemption in the manner of regulation is as necessary 
as preemption in a law’s purpose for that analysis,
173
 so the dissent 
presupposed that the AEA applied to conventional mining on private land 
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based on the idea that all safety concerns related to nuclear power have 
been preempted by the federal government.
174
 However, this is inconsistent 
with the text of § 2021(k), which states that it applies to activities already 
under federal purview for the purpose of controlling nuclear dangers.
175
 
Thus, preemption under § 2021(k) should only be applicable if the state law 
relates to a preexisting federal regulation; and in consideration of other 
federal nuclear laws, it is apparent that conventional mining on private 
lands is not something the federal government has authority over. This 
presupposition that simply because the activity of mining is related to 
nuclear power it is under the purview of the NRC ignores the text of the 
AEA. Although, the dissent’s analysis is correct in its form, it doesn’t fit the 
context of this case.  
The leading opinion should not be authoritative over the concurrence 
because its adoption would undermine the application of the purpose-
inquiry established in PG&E. Although I disagree with the dissent’s use of 
the purpose inquiry in this case, the leading opinion launches a sharp 
departure from Court precedent. It is one thing to do as the concurrence, not 
conducting a purpose inquiry because it would be inappropriate, but it is 
another thing to refuse a purpose inquiry and explain that doing so would 
be unfeasible. Justice Gorsuch’s musings on judicial inquiry of legislative 
intent could have ripple effects in the future. By stating that “[t]he only 
thing a court can be sure of is what can be found in the law itself,”
176
 the 
leading opinion degrades the applicability of legislative intent when 
interpreting a statute. Although Justice Gorsuch does not crush the PG&E 
purpose inquiry, his opinion does narrow its application to only those words 
expressing purpose in the legislation. This narrow inquiry would be 
difficult to perform in states that do not elaborate on legislative purpose, 
and it would give state legislatures a shield to hide behind if there is a 
constitutional challenge of a law in federal court.
177
 Justice Gorsuch’s 
interest in not stifling the prerogative of the legislature may well end up 
stifling the power of the judiciary. 
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The consequences of the Virginia Uranium decision are subtle, but 
strong. As a result of this decision, it is now conclusive that the NRC does 
not have authority over conventional mining on private lands, and the soil 
of Coles Hill will remain undisturbed. Because the dissenting opinion’s 
arguments are misplaced, and the leading opinion’s reasoning runs amuck, 
the concurring opinion should be adopted as the authoritative precedent 
among the lower courts and in future preemption cases before the Court. It 
adheres closely with existing precedent, while arriving at a logical 
conclusion based on the relevant facts and laws. The regulation of nuclear 
energy is just as necessary today as it was eighty years ago, so it is 
important for the state and federal governments to cooperate in controlling 
the hazards of the technology while fostering the development of its 
potential benefits. This decision substantiates the power of the states in the 
paradigm of protection, while providing a definition of federal powers. 
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